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AKUI - AKSI KEMANUSIAAN UNTUK INDONESIA HUMANITARIAN ACTION FOR INDONESIA Editors: Lea Pamungkas, Lily
Djojoatmodjo, and Teresa Birks Editorial Note An Indonesia poet has described his own country as a 'country of
conjurers.'Conjuring where absurd logic can no longer find its roots in
reality.Need proof?Let's examine the case of Jono (35) who was arrested early
last January as a suspect in the bombing of 4 churches in Poso. Two weeks
previously, this young man was one of the signatories of the Malino
Declaration. His appearance amongst a number of important Muslim and
Christian leaders raised a few eyebrows. Because Jono introduced himself as a
representative of Poso Muslims. Yet not one Muslim group in Poso had
recommended Jono. Nor was Jono registered as an activist or a member of any
Islamic faction anywhere in Poso District.
And throughout almost 3 years on unrest, not once had the Muslim community in Poso seen or heard of Jono
assisting the Muslim struggle in Poso. So there you have it. And in this country of conjurers, the politics
of thuggery (premanism) is adopted as a political strategy by a various
elements of the state. It is this practice which has cost 5000 lives in
Poso. And so now in the wake of the Malino Declaration I, which used up 100 billion Rupiah, all types of
‘tricks’ have been invoked by the conjurers:
manipulating the data of internally displaced persons (IDPs) so that
it appears larger, appropriating money intended for the victims,
appropriating their ‘share’ in order to build their houses, whilst the IDPs
are left to suffer. Given the reality of this situation, it is our opinion that the
international community should address this problem with clarity, and avoid
being ensnared into the pattern of political games being played out in
Indonesia. And in order that the funds reach those in need - however small -
it would be best if the assistance intended for the IDPs disbursed via the Indonesian government be
accompanied by a request for transparency and accountability, as well as the
direct involvement of the people themselves.
Thus it is hoped that a control mechanism be created on the side of
the people which might eliminate all the ‘conjuring tricks.’ POSO’s CONFLICT : LOCAL POLITICAL ELITE POWER PLAY ARENA Introduction In Poso, Central Sulawesi there are estimated to be at least 97,655
IDPs, and losses incurred due to unrest which has taken place since 24
December 1998 are thought to be in the region of Rp. 300 billion. The District, which has a population of
231,898 inhabitants is known as a rich and fertile area famous for its cocoa,
cloves, rice and ebony. The people of
Poso are made up of a number of ethnic groups such as the Bungku, Mori,
Pamona, Lore and Tojo - the majority of whom are Christian - live in harmony with outside groups who have settled in the area, including
the Bugis, Makasar, Gorontalo, Javanese and Arabs, the majority of whom are
Muslim. Other settlers include
Minahasa, Balinese and Chinese.
Before 24 December 1998, relations in general between them was
relatively harmonious. However, after this date, a number of different conflicts emerged and it Poso. News concerning the conflict in Poso reported in a variety of media
both at home and abroad in general (only) describe the unrest as the result
of horizontal conflict between different religious and ethnic groups.
However, when asked, the people of Poso themselves stated that they ‘didn’t
know’ what the roots of the conflict were, (Media Indonesia, 6.1.02) which
has resulted in more than 5,000 deaths (data from the Centre for Legal
Advocacy and Human Rights - PAHAM, Pusat Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Asasi
Manusia, January 2002). In general, the people themselves are also not able to state who exactly is responsible for the unrest
which has not only resulted in material losses, but loss of life as
well. Ny Misna for example, a mother
of three, is seeking refuge in the West Palu Gawalise Stadium and says that
those responsible for setting fore to her home in Sintuwu valley in Lage
Sub-district were unidentified armed personnel. The majority of the people of Poso, particularly those at grassroots
level, in general tend not to understand what the “Jakarta Government” means
when it refers to the ethnic and religious conflict, something increasingly
evident since the ‘First Malino Declaration’ (issued on 18 December 2001 by
the Jakarta Government as part of its efforts to end the conflict). In
Tokorondo village, dozens of Christian inhabitants returned to their homes
after having sought refuge elsewhere. Halfway along the Trans-Sulawesi
highway, which runs through Tokorondo village, they came across a number of
trucks carrying their Muslim neighbours. Spontaneously, they all got out of
their vehicles and embraced one another - not surprising when two long-parted
friends meet up again. A report by KONTRAS (The Commission for the Disappeared and the
Victims of Violence - Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban
Kekerasan),concerning Poso which was published in the middle of 2000 states
that religious and ethnic conflict was not the only reason for the conflict
in Poso. Also important has been the
power politics played out by the local elite in order to maintain control,
often supported by the power and authority of both civilian and military
government institutions, their members and others too. Using masks, wearing ‘ninja’ style outfits
and Committing brutal acts, they not only provoked the local inhabitants,
but also adopted a scorched earth policy,committed acts of violence and
killings. This phenomenon is known as Political Premanism, (paid thugs, often
unemployed, disenfranchised youth,in the pay of political interests,ed ). This is a phenomenon often witnessed
throughout the unrest in Maluku. Observations by PAHAM add that aside from the power politics of the
local elite as well as religious and ethnic conflict, in the middle of 2001,
the conflict spread between the local people and TNI (military) and Brimob
(special police unit) forces.
Findings by Komnas HAM (The National Commission for Human Rights)
indicate that there were at least 600 members of Laskar Jihad (a militant
Islamic organisation) posted in Poso. They began to arrive at the beginning
of October 2001, under the auspices of providing humanitarian assistance to
the IDPs. One of Komnas HAM’s recommendations was that the Government
Immediately withdraw all members of Laskar Jihad from Poso. In response to
the Komnas HAM recommendation, the Minister for Coordination of Political and
Security Affairs Menkopolkam), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, stated that there
was no significant difference between the process and findings between the
government and the Komnas HAM fact-finding team. He stated that 70% of the
findings by the government and Komnas HAM were the same. Thus far the Indonesian Government has not been serious in its
handling of the real source of the conflict, not only in Poso, but also in
West and Central Kalimantan, Maluku and Aceh. The roots of the problem both
vertical as well as horizontal have neither been addressed nor resolved.
Government initiatives to resolve the conflict have been minimal and give the
impression of being quick-fix, piecemeal responses. It was not until 18 December 2001 that the Government issued the
Malino Agreement for Poso (also known as the First Malino Declaration). This
initiative was received by the two warring parties in Poso, and went some way
to reducing the scale of the violence in Poso. However, the declaration was
not founded at grassroots level. In general, the people of Poso are willing to receive help in any
shape or form which is aimed to resolve the Poso conflict, however, their
involvement is rarely sought. Yet in terms
of the destruction in the wake of the violence, they find it harder to
accept. They still await the government to fulfil its promises in respect of
aid and assistance for them. BACKGROUND a. Local Political Elite Power Play Arena Based on an investigation report by KONTRAS in respect of Poso, which was carried out between 19 June - 21 July 2000, the beginnings
of the conflict in Poso which have become what we are concerned with today
lie with the power play of the political elite in order to ensure their power
and control by using the strength of/putting pressure on the masses and
making use of misguided policies/authority of civilian and military
government forces. This political
power play provided a conducive arena for provocation of religious and ethnic
differences. The strength of feelings of solidarity within the different clans and differences in
character enable the local inhabitants into being provoked. In the end it was
religious differences that became the strongest weapon in seeking support and
solidarity, as well as being a relatively easy matter to ‘sell’ to outside parties as the reason
behind the conflict. The role of religious leaders - who in traditional Indonesian life are
often the pillars of society - did not function as they should have when
called upon, moreover “were involved/involved themselves” in the conflict.
Several incidents indicate that a number of religious and local leaders as
well as government officials were to be found in the midst of the unrest,
leading, mobilising and funding mass activities. The involvement of local
government officials is also proven by the fact that monies used to fund the unrest include funds intended for the benefit of the
people, namely from the Farmers Cooperative Fund (KUT, Koperasi Unit Tani). Other reasons why the unrest spread (throughout 2001 the unrest
continued unchecked)lies in the local people’s disappointment with the role
of the law enforcement agencies. Even in cases where the names of those
thought to have been implicated in the unrest were identified by the police,
with sufficient evidence to back-up their suspicions,nothing was done by way
of follow-up by the law enforcement agencies. As many as 28 members of the military and 14 police officers
who were arrested in 2000, on suspicion of having been implicated in the
unrest, as well as dozens of government officials believed to have been
perpetrators of the violence. Yet their cases have been ‘lost’ and forgotten
and there has been no follow up.
There has been some kind of legal impunity at work that hasn’t in any
way taken into account the need for justice of the people of Poso. This
reality is also reinforced by the behaviour of members of the armed
forces. Both when handling the unrest
as well as when carrying out stop and search operations for weapons, the
attitude of the military soon lost the sympathy of the people. They were not
only rude and brusque, but their actions were accompanied with threats and
violence, beating up inhabitants who had knives, as well as burning down
whole villages. Members of the armed forces were not afraid to steal the
possessions of the local inhabitants, none of which were in any way relevant
to the object of their operations (household appliances, farm animals etc.). Facing loss of hope and trust in the law enforcement agencies and
failing to gain any protection from the security forces, the people in the
end sought their own remedies. This is evidenced by the training of indigenous peoples of Poso in the
Kele’i mountain range area in North Pamona Sub-district in order to carry out
attack and to seek out the provocateurs who were at loose in the area. b. Process of the Poso Conflict In general the Poso conflict may be divided into 4 periods, namely o
Poso I (December 1998); o
Poso II (April 2000); o
Poso III (May 2000) and o
Poso IV (October 2001). POSO I The conflict in Poso which has cost so many thousands of lives, has
its roots in a ‘simple’ incident. Namely, the fight between youths who happened
to be from different religious backgrounds, because they were drunk, which
eventually spread and destroyed a settlement giving rise to a feeling of solidarity in the
name of religion. When the Central Sulawesi Governor visited the area of the unrest, a
number of names were circulating, of those who were referred to as ‘security
disturbers,’ of GPK Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan), from both of the warring
parties. The names include Herman Parimo (Christian) and Aziz Lapatoro
(Muslim). Before his case made it to the courts, Herman died whilst in
detention, and it has since been proved that Agfar Patanga was the person responsible for circulating
the list of names. He is the head of Poso District local government, who is
also the younger brother of the Poso District Regent. During that period there were a number of demands (which would be More
appropriately be referred to as threats, ed.) from a member of the Central
Sulawesi Provincial Government (DPRD Tk I), Haelani Umar who was quoted in
the local press, “Mercusuar” as saying, “if Damsyik Djaelani is not appointed
as Poso Regional Secretary, then there will be unrest during Poso II which
will be far greater than the unrest during Poso I.” POSO II Before the matter of the circulation of the list of names was able to
be completely resolved, the unrest known as Poso II erupted on 6 April 2000.
This time the background to the unrest lay also in a fight between youths of
different religious backgrounds. The unrest spread to all corners of the town
of Poso, and the masses resorted to the use of knives and machetes as well as other homemade weapons. In the wake of the unrest, an initiative emerged from a number of individuals who claimed to be local and religious leaders to go to the
Poso Regent’s official residence. Their demands bore no relation to the
ongoing situation, but they demanded, inter alia, that 1. Damsyk
Djaelani be returned to the position of Regional Secretary; 2. Brimob
forces be withdrawn from Poso; 3. the Agfar
Patanga case be put on hold and 4. The Poso
Chief of Police be decommissioned.
These demands clearly indicate that there was conflict between the
interests of the local political elite as well as conflict between the police
and the military. POSO III On 22 May 2000, more violent conflict once more broke out. At that time, a group emerged which called
itself the Kelelawar Hitam (Black Bats) which resulted in 3 deaths, including
a police officer from Kayamanaya. Meanwhile, the Catholic Housing Complex as
well as the Wali Songo Islamic School (Pesantren) were completely destroyed. The mass slaughter
took place in a number of different places and locations. Most of the corpses
found in the Poso River had their hands tied and were headless. The bodies
buried in Lawanga area are difficult to identify, because they were not
complete and had been partly burnt too. POSO IV The conflict spread and included clashes between the local people and
the military and Brimob. The situation in Poso continued to degenerate. The peak
of the violence took place during November, with the result that the Bishop
of Manado, Mgr Yosephus Suwutan MSC issued and emergency call for help, an
SOS, for the people of Poso. This call was made by Mgr Suwatan in connection
with conditions in Poso and several other surrounding areas which were
causing grave concern because there was every indication of the possibility
of the total annihilation of the local population. Moreover, the town of
Tentena which was home to around 30,000 Christian IDPs, was in danger of
being attacked. And at that time, Tentena was the only town that was
relatively safe for the IDPs. The conflict, that had been blamed on religion, was intensifying just
as Suwatan had stated, and he admitted that he had received a copy of a letter
written by a group of local inhabitants who described themselves as the Poso
District Christian People (MKKP, Masyarakat Kristen Kabupaten Poso), which
was addressed to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan. Its contents included: 1. a request
for UN intervention in order to stop the violence and human rights violations
which were taking place in Poso District, particularly in Christian villages; 2. that the
security forces (military and police) were not able to uphold law and order,
with the result that law and order was now in the hands of the Laskar Jihad; 3. that the
Indonesian government was not able to end or resolve the conflict which had
continued over the last 3 years and which had cost the lives of thousands of
victims as well as material losses; 4. that if
the situation was not contained, the attacks would continue and would result
in a serious humanitarian tragedy and 5. that the current conditions (29
November 2001, 20.00) were increasingly tense. Attacks, arson, killings and
plunder were taking place everywhere at the hands of unidentified armed
groups and/or who wore the mask of Laskar Jihad, as a trend of mass politics
which had the aim of developing a culture of political premanism. CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE The First Malino Declaration and the deployment of the Military First/Fast Strike Units (PPRC, Pasukan Pemukulan Reaksi Cepat) a. Political Solution The Central Government (read Jakarta) via the Coordinating Minister for Cooperatives and Prosperity,
Yusuf Kalla, took the initiative to hold a meeting between the two groups
(perceived groups, ed.) who were in conflict in Poso, in Malino, Gowa, South Sulawesi. Witnessed by the
South Sulawesi Governor (as host), the Governor of Central Sulawesi, the VII Wirabuana Military Commander,
Secretary General of the Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama
Islam), representatives of the Alliance of Churches in Indonesia (PGI,
Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia), 24 members of the Christian delegation
and 25 member of the Muslim delegation signed what has become known as the First Malino
Declaration. The contents of the First Malino Declaration include: 1. the end to
all forms of conflict and disagreement; 2. observe
all forms and efforts to uphold the law and support legal sanctions made against
anyone who violates the law; 3. call upon
the state security forces to act firmly and justly in order to restore
security; 4. to ensure= the creation of a peaceful
atmosphere, reject the implementation of civilian emergency as well as involvement
by foreign parties; 5. remove all
libellous claims and dishonesty against all parties and uphold a mutual
feeling of respect and forgiveness in order to create harmony; 6. that Poso
is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. Thus, each and every
inhabitant has the right to live, to move to and exist peacefully and
respecting the local customs; 7. all rights
and possessions must be returned to the rightful owners, as was the case
prior to the outbreak of unrest; 8. return all
IDPs to their villages; 9. carry out
total economic rehabilitation in cooperation with the government; 10. carry out
the religious duties and observances of the respective religions in an
atmosphere of mutual respect, and observe all regulations which have been
agreed upon, both in relations to legislation and government decrees and
other stipulations. Realisation of the declaration was to be implemented by means of the
Commission for Security and Law and Order as well as the Social Commission.
The contents and role of the Commission for Security and Law and Order were
circulated and made public between 21 December 20001 and 6 January 2002. The relocation of the IDPs back to their
villages was carried out between 7 February and 7 March 2002. The upholding
of law and order began on 7 February and is scheduled for a period of five
months. As part of the law and order process, there will be an arms amnesty
whereby all the inhabitants of Poso must hand in their weapons. If this is
not observed, then under the Emergency Legislation, the perpetrator may receive the death
sentence. b. Implementation The first stage implemented was the handing over of weapons from both
sides which have thus far (been perceived as) being in conflict. During the first 2 weeks after the First
Malino Declaration was made, as many as 19,128 weapons were handed over to
the security forces. According to local security forces estimates, around
8,141 of those weapons have already been destroyed. The deadline for the handover of weapons was up until 7
February last. Apparently in order to speed up the stages decided upon by the Government, the military have deployed around 350 First/Fast Strike
personnel (PPRC) in Poso since 15 January 2002 and it is planned that they
will be on the ground for around 3 months. This raises questions concerning the likelihood of putting an end to
violence and unrest by increasing the number of military personnel on the
ground, bearing in mind that they are indeed an element of the violence in
question. Also using the justification of ensuring that the situation in Poso be
contained, the local police have arrested around 3,000 newcomers to Poso who
are said to have no identification. They are said to have come from Central
Java and South Sulawesi. They were then sent back home by the police themselves because most of them did not have sufficient funds for the journey back. The Central Sulawesi Chief of Police,
Brigadier General H Zainal Abidin Ishak stated that this was being done
because since 7 January it had been decreed that newcomers should leave Poso. In respect of the 3,000 ‘newcomers’ referred to above, it is perfectly
possible that they include IDPs originally from Poso who were forced to seek
refuge in a number of areas, including Central Java and South Sulawesi. During the panic and violence, where a
number of villages were razed to the ground, there were killings and death
threats, is it likely that an ID card would be the first thing to be
saved? If it turns out that many of
the 3,000 are indeed Poso IDPs, then what has occurred is indeed an act of
impropriety that violates the local people. IDPs VICTIMS OF THE UNREST The Indonesian government system established in order to respond to the needs of IDPs is extremely unclear. The links between the centre and the regions has been
reorganised. On the one hand there has been a process of decentralisation,
where many decisions are taken by the local government itself. On the other
hand, decisions taken concerning assistance to IDPs are made by Bakornas, the
National Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Nasional). Presidential Decree
No. 3 Year 2001 gives Bakornas the
authority to coordinate and received assistance from the international community
in order to disburse it via local government and other related agencies as
determined by both central and local
government. The bureaucratic hierarchy which includes various components from ministers to the National Social Prosperity Board (Badan Kesejahteran
Sosial Nasional), has rendered the government’s response to IDP needs very
slow indeed. This situation is of great concern, particularly bearing in mind
that government assistance for IDPs over the last three years of IDP problems
in Indonesia has not been effective, has
not made it to the IDPs themselves, is not disbursed in a routine
manner, is not in accordance with sums agreed upon or has even been stalled
in the provincial governor’s bank account. This matter is further complicated by the existence of regulations at
national as well as local level that are concerned with IDPs. One of these
that is currently causing problems concerns the Coordinating Body for
Disaster Management and IDP/Refugee Assistance (Bakornas PBP), headed by the Vice President and a number of ministers. They rarely consult with or involve NGOs and the
local people. They are very centralised and elitist and belittle
participation by the people at grassroots level. Other factors which
contribute to the chaotic nature of response to IDP problems is the lack of coordination
between government agencies in the field, the appropriation of assistance
earmarked for the IDPs by government officials, and the procedure for
handling IDP problems which in effect does not take into consideration Basic
Principles on Internal Displacement). In addition, there is absolutely no transparency in the handling and
disbursement of assistance, and the government has been disbursing
humanitarian aid via bureaucratic channels without involving local CSOs on
the ground. There is no accountability
for the government aid intended for IDPs, which has been appropriated by
unaccountable government officials.
According to PAHAM overseas aid which has been obtained by the
Indonesian Government in order to assist the IDPs, is always much smaller
when disbursed than the original sum given. IDP Conditions The IDP victims of the Poso conflict are spread out in a number of towns/regions in Central Sulawesi, such as Palu, Parigi, Ampana,
Tentena, Luwu, as well as Manado (North Sulawesi), Ujung Pandang (South
Sulawesi), and several other towns on the island of Java. According to KONTRAS, conditions in the
IDP camps (which are usually sports stadia) are highly inappropriate,
particularly in respect of sanitation. The camps overflow with water when it
rains and rubbish lies scattered around, creating conditions highly conducive
to the spread of disease. Malaria, chest infections and diarrhoea are the
main diseases which the IDPs are vulnerable to. At the height of the conflict, between May and June 2001, according to
PAHAM figures, 5,000 people were killed, 10,000 houses were burnt to the
ground and around 70,000 people sought refuge outside of Poso. The largest
displacement of people took place in Palu where at one point as many as 40,000 people were relocated. The largest number of IDPs were camped at
the Gawalise sports stadium. The worst conditions are to be found in Tentena. Most of the IDPs are indigenous inhabitants of Poso, namely the Christian Pamona or
Mori people. They are not able to leave the camp and facilities are minimal.
And as has already been publicised, government assistance for day to day
needs was stopped at the end of December. The displacement has had a very damaging impact on all the people of Poso, particularly the women and children. Most of the children
have experience trauma in the wake of the conflict, having witnessed the
violence and killing of members of their families. The Poso Department of Health has stated that 30% of the 20,000
Poso IDPs have experience psychological disturbances. The Director of the
Central Mamboro Hospital in Poso as said the same of the 1,325 IDPs located
in Palu, of whom 1,323 he states have suffered from stress. Three hundred and
ninety-three of them are children. He added that psychological problems have been experienced by around 31% of the children, 30% of adults whereas around 26% have
experienced depression. Around 17% are quick to anger and are irritable, 10%
have suffered from psychosis and 29% have lost the will to work. Relocation and Repatriation of the IDPs Since September 2001, the government took the decision that it would end the emergency livelihood aid/day to day needs funding for
the IDPs and stated that the IDP problem would be resolved by the end of 2002
(now Indonesia has 1.4 million IDPs)., with funds totalling Rp. 2 trillion (
EU 200 million) For Poso, the
Government has stated that it would take six months (from 1 December
2001 to 31 May 2002) to resolve the IDP problem, in three main stages, namely
ending the conflict followed up with arms decommissioning by the two parties,
upholding law and order in the conflict area and then protecting and
promoting public order in the area. This ultimatum was adopted by the Poso
local government, and funding of Rp 100 billion has been disbursed. As a result of these decisions, the IDPs from Poso have been given two options, either to return back to their homes (repatriation) or to
be relocated to transmigration area in Donggala District. The repatriation
option has usually been turned down by the largest number of IDPs, out of
fear for their safety. It also seems that the Government is not yet in a
position to handle the numerous problems which it faces. This is evidenced by
the explanation given by the head of the Central Sulawesi Settelement
Programme (Kepala Dinas Pemukiman Prasarana Wilayah Sulteng), Mashud Kasim,
that post the First Malino Declaration, the Central Government (read Jakarta)
does not yet have sufficient funding to build 6,054 homes for the IDPs who have
chosen to be repatriated. The relocation process has also experienced problems. In May 2001, 1,187 people took part in the transmigration programme in
Donggala District. However, the programme only lasted 5 months (October 2001)
when 19 families decided to return to the IDP camp, citing that conditions in
the field were not in accordance with government promises as their reason. Use of IDP Funds After the Malino Declaration, the Indonesian Government stated that it
would set aside Rp. 100 million for the rehabilitation of homes, schools and
places of prayer, as well as for compensation for the families of those who
were killed. Each house destroyed is eligible to Rp. 5 million - Rp. 4
million for the cost of building materials and Rp. 1 million for repairs. Rp. 2 million has been allocated by way of
compensation to the families of the dead.
It was planned that between January and June 2002, the programme to return the IDPs to their homes would be implemented. Particularly in respect of efforts to rehabilitate housing for the
IDPs, two weeks after the Government statement regarding allocation of funds as above, Mashud Kasim
stated that he had not yet received the funds needed to rebuild the 6,054
units of temporary housing for the IDPs who were to be returned to their
villages. In order to deal with this problem, the Government decided to work together with a number of state-owned companies (BUMN, Badan Usaha
Milik Negara), including PT Hutama Karya, PT Wijaya Karya, PT Adhi Karya, PT
Brantas Abipraya and PT Pembangunan Perumahan (the majority of the shares of
4 of the 5 companies are owned by the children and cronies of ex-President
Suharto, ed.). According to Kasim, they were forced to work with these
companies because the need for temporary shelter was urgent, but the funding
had not yet been disbursed. There is also the problem of compensation for the homes destroyed in the conflict, which has not been implemented and allocated as was
stated. According to government statements, for each house destroyed, the
occupants would received Rp. 5 million. However, according to Inamullah from
Tokorondo, the assistance they have received thus far has been in the form of
13 sacks of cement, 40 sheets of galvanized zinc, 21 sheets of triplex and
1.5 cubic metres of wood. If added
up, this is far short of the Rp. 4 million sum allocated for building
materials. According to Inamullah,
not all the villagers of Tokorondo have received assistance from the
government. And the government has
not yet explained the criteria used in order to determined who is eligible to
assistance and who isn’t. The people
and the IDPs who have suffered such great losses throughout the conflict and
its aftermath have been forced through necessity to accept whatever it is
determined by the Government. * This publication has been made possible with the cooperation of
NOVIB. AKUI- Aksi Kemanusiaan untuk Indonesia Humanitarian Action For Indonesia Postbank : 741548 Kvk. 3410743 Address: Indonesia House Jacob van Lennepkade 255, 1054 ZS Amsterdam, Tel.: 020-7774949,
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