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Titel
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The Tragedy of Maluku
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Auteur
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George J. Aditjondro, Ph.D.
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Datum
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6 mei 2000
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The orgy of violence in Timor Lorosa'e (East Timor),
last year, has reminded the world of the plight of the Melanesian peoples who
live west of the 141st Meridian East. The standard belief is that a third of
the pre-invasion 600,000 East Timorese people have died during the Indonesian
occupation.
This is, unfortunately, only one part of the plight of the Western
Melanesian, or "Indo-Melanesian" peoples who have lived under the
wings of the Republic of Indonesia. Or, are still living under the Indonesian
colonial yoke, which consist of three other groups, namely (a) the West
Papuan people who inhabit the western half of the island of New Guinea, which
consists of abour 240 ethno-linguistic groups; (b). the Maluku (Moluccan)
people, who inhabit the more or less thousand islands of Maluku (Moluccas),
west of New Guinea, among whom there are distinctions between North Maluku,
South Maluku, and Southeast Maluku; and (c). the Eastern Nusa Tenggara
people, who inhabit the western part of the island of Timor and the adjacent
island groups of Flores, Sumba, and the smaller islands off Flores, such as
the traditional whaling island of Lembata.
Public knowledge of the plight of these Indo-Melanesian peoples is very
limited, in Indonesia as well as abroad, for the following reasons. Firstly,
according to standard anthropological knowledge, Melanesia (= the islands, or
archipelago of the black-skinned peoples) end at the western tip of the
island New Guinea. Secondly, the international community of nation-states, as
represented by the United Nations, has only supported Timor Lorosa'e's claim
to nationhood and had never accepted Indonesia's annexation of the former
Portuguese colony. On the other hand, the annexation of West Papua by
Indonesia in 1963 has been 'legalized' by the UN General Assembly when on
September 21, 1962, it recognized the results of the so-called 'Act of Free
Choice' in West Papua a month earlier.
The third reason is that the international community has religiously clung to
two myths about the Indonesian nation-state. Firstly, the myth that Indonesia
is the legitimate 'successor state' of the Dutch East Indies colony, and
secondly, the myth that the Indonesian people -- with the exception of the
Chinese ethnic minority -- is a homogenous nation, like Japan, for instance.
The first myth is supported by many Indonesian citizens as well as all
nations which consists predominantly of people of European descent. Rejecting
this 'successor state' myth may force many nation-states in the world to
reject their own post-colonial boundaries, which may consequently force them
to recognize the pre-invasion boundaries of all the indigenous political
entities which have been brushed over by the European settlers and their
descendants.
The irony of this 'successor state' myth is that many post-colonial
nation-state in Asia and Latin America have broken down the existing colonial
boundaries. Spain's American colonies do not consist of a single state with
its capital somewhere in Bogota, but consists of dozens of independent yet
Spanish-speaking (not Mayan or Incan speaking, sic!) nation-states.
Likewise in Asia, the former British colony of India now consists of India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and, lest we forget, Burma. Its British counterpart in
Southeast Asia consists of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam. In
other words, the existence of the archipelagic republic of Indonesia which
stretches from Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra to Merauke near West
Papua's border with Papua New Guinea, is certainly not a God given, natural
construct. It is a historical construct and most probably, a historical
mistake if its defenders are too stubborn to transform it into a more
democratic construct, where all the ethno-linguistic groups and 'supra-tribal
groups'(1) could live in harmony with each other with none dominating others.
Speaking about 'supra-tribal groups' we are touching on the second myth,
namely that Indonesia is a homogenous nation(2), which is certainly
incorrect. One can even say that apart from being multi-ethnic, Indonesia is
also a multi-racial nation, if we classify the Melanesian peoples as
belonging to a different race than the Malays.
Apart from the recent migrations of Arabic, Indian, Chinese and Europeans and
whose ancestors have no geographical links with any place within the
Nusantara archipelago, the Indonesian peoples basically consist of three
'supra-tribal groups' who migrated to this archipelago hundreds or thousands
of years ago.
The first 'supra-tribal group' are the Melanesian peoples, to be followed by
Proto-Malay, and finally came Deutero-Malay peoples who linguistically,
belong to the Polynesian 'race'. The waves of Malay migrations have pushed
the Melanesian people more and more to Eastern Indonesia, from where they
eventually migrated to the South Pacific. In Eastern Indonesia itself,
inter-marriages of Malay migrants with the indigenous Melanesian peoples have
resulted in the Maluku, Flores and Timorese peoples who are lighter skinned
with more curly hair than the darker and more frizzy haired Melanesians of
New Guinea.
These intermarriages between Malay and Melanesian peoples in Eastern
Indonesia have also resulted in Melanesian peoples adopting many Polynesian
cultural traits, which have been transferred to the South Pacific.
Austronesian languages, is one example, and maritime knowledge -- from canoe
building(3), astronomy, navigation, to fishery -- is another. In fact, I
believe that it was the adoption of many Polynesian skills that enabled the
Melanesian peoples to migrate and settle down in far away
Archipelagos in the Pacific such as Tahiti.
Unfortunately, while the Melanesian peoples are the oldest, indigenous
peoples in Nusantara (4), they are also the most culturally, politically, and
economically the most oppressed peoples in this archipelago. This brings me
to the focus of my presentation, which is the tragedy of Maluku.
First of all, let me focus on cultural oppression. There is a popular belief
among the people of Java and Sumatra, that favours a lighter skin colour.
Centuries of European domination, as well as the Indian Ramayana and
Mahabharata epics from India, which have been indigenized by the Javanese,
are probably the origin of this 'pro-light skin' favouritism, as well as its
opposite pair, namely disfavour of dark skins.
In addition to this antipathy to darker skin colour, the Javanese also look
down on peoples from the Outer Islands who live more closer to nature, such
as the Dayak people of Kalimantan. The term 'ndayak ' in the popular Javanese
language practically means 'barbarian'. So, combining these two beliefs, one
would certainly not expect much appreciation to the highland or Asmat peoples
of West Papua among the Javanese people. Popular jokes are also abundant in
Java, about the hair body of the Papuan people (as well as of Caucasoids), or
subtle or non-subtle references to apes, which are also darker skinned and
hairy.
Religious and historical facts also contribute to the low esteem of many
Javanese -- intellectuals included -- for the Melanesians of Maluku and West
Papua. Many Ambonese (5) from Maluku were recruited into the Dutch colonial
forces, and their role in assisting the Dutch to crush the independence
movement in Java and Sumatra had resulted in the negative nickname,
"Belanda hitam " or "Londo ireng ", which means,
"Black Dutchmen" to those colonial soldiers (6). As in many other
stereotypes, the Ambonese were not the only Indonesian ethnic group to join
the Dutch colonial army, or KNIL (7). However, prejudice of many elder
Indonesians, who had been traumatized by the raids of the indigenous KNIL
soldiers during the independence war from 1945 to 1949, seems to last long.
This prejudice against the Ambonese is the strongest among Muslim Javanese
and Sumatranese against Christian Ambonese, due to the stereotype that they
all joined the Dutch colonial army, KNIL. Like all stereotypes, this is only
a half-truth, since the first ethno-linguistic group to rebel and raise arms
against the Dutch colonial forces were the Ambonese, under the leadership of
Thomas Matulessy, also known by his title, Pattimura, and Christina Martha
Tiahohu, who were both Christians.
The prejudice of mainstream Indonesians from Java and Sumatra against the
Ambonese was reinforced by the fact that the first 'ethnic' rebellion against
the newborn Indonesian Republic also occurred in Ambon, with the declaration
of the South Moluccans Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan , or RMS) on April
25, 1950, soon after the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in
December 1949. This declaration of Central Moluccan independence was mainly
triggered by two factors. First, uncertainties about the demobilization of
the former Moluccan soldiers of the colonial army (KNIL), and secondly, the
fear of South Maluku -- formerly a district within the East Indonesia state
of the short-lived federal structure, the United Indonesian Republic
(Republik Indonesia Serikat = RIS).
This second factor was predominantly strong among the Christian-dominated
Ambonese elite (civil servants, teachers, and church personnel), who
rightfully feared that the Ambonese would become a powerless minority within
a Java-centred and Muslim-dominated Indonesian state. However, to avoid being
seen as an elite group, the RMS initiators sought the support of the village
chiefs (raja), and obtained that support from Ibrahim Ohorella, the Raja of
Tulehu, a Muslim village which was also the main source of sago on the island
of Ambon. In fact, the entire preparations for the declaration took place in
Tulehu, to escape from both Indonesian as well as the remaining Dutch
security apparatus' eyes (for the history of the RMS, see Chavel, 1990).
The flames of hatred of the 'Christian Ambonese traitors' is currently being
fanned by certain Muslim groups, who have popularised a conspiracy theory
that the religious riots in Maluku were initiated by the Moluccan Protestant
Church (GPM = Gereja Protestan Maluku), in colaboration with RMS militants
from the Netherlands (8) and Megawati Sukarnoputri's Christian-Nationalist
party, PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan) (9).
Let us now move on from cultural to economic oppression. While upholding the
political structure of Indonesia as a unitarian republic, the late President
Sukarno was much willing to accomodate the rebellious regions in Indonesia,
after those rebellions had been crushed (10). In the case of Maluku, Sukarno
decided to locate certain development projects of national -- or even,
international -- in the 'thousand islands' province, namely the Wayame
shipyard on Ambon, the Oceanography Research Institute at Poka, Ambon, and
the huge sugar mill at Makariki, on Seram. Also, during
Sukarno's presidency, several top Ambonese Christian intellectuals raised to
national prominence. Indonesia's first research nuclear reactor was named
after an Ambonese engineer, Siwabessy (11).
After Sukarno had been topled by Suharto in a military coup, which was
followed by a purge of between 500,000 to 2,000,000 suspected Communists and
members of the mass organizations of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI
(Partai Komunis Indonesia ), the central government's attitude towards Maluku
changed radically. One by one, Sukarno's 'prestige projects' in Maluku, as
the New Order liked to frame them, were dismantled and re-assembled on Java.
The Wayame shipyard was moved to Surabaya, East Java, and became the
Navy-controlled shipyard, PT PAL. The Makariki sugar mill was dismantled and
re-installed at Jatiroto, also in East Java. Finally, the status of the
Oceanography Institute in Ambon was reduced to become simply a station of the
Jakarta-based National Oceanography Institute (LON) under the Indonesian
Academy of Sciences. Construction of the institute's main laboratory in
Ambon, which was previously a Soviet grant project, was discontinued
(Aditjondro, 1990).
Next, instead of trying to please the Moluccans, Suharto-linked conglomerates
began to feast on Maluku's abundant natural resources. The Banda Sea,
abundant with its tuna fish, was at one stage leased out for 25 years to a
Japanese fishing cooperative, which after 8 years was discontinued after
numerous protests by local fisherfolks, environmentalists, and nationalists,
who disagreed with the extent to which the Suharto regime seemed to please
the Japanese creditors. This is when the Moluccan intelligentsia began to
feel deprived and marginalized, becoming stepchildren of progress, and guests
in their own house.
Nascent Moluccan nationalism, or to be more accurate, regionalist feeling
began to emerge, and Ambonese intellectuals began to join environmental
watchdog groups, after Suharto since 1978 began to push the environmental
line to woo young campus radicals away from campus-based and Jakarta-oriented
politics.
Unfortunately, what in Jakarta seemed to be well accepted, and was fully
endorsed by Suharto's Minister of Environment, Emil Salim, was in the
TNI-controlled province the opposite. Academics from the Pattimura University
of Ambon, who assisted local villagers to defend their land rights vis-a-vis
the powerful Djajanti Group, which was 10% owned by Suharto's cousin, Sudwikatmono,
were arrested by the local military officers and accused of being RMS
symphatizers (Fakta, July 15, 1988: 44, December 1, 1988: 47).(12)
In addition to the economic exploitation by the Suharto-linked forestry,
fishery, cement and sago conglomerates, Maluku's wealth was also syphoned to
Jakarta through the corruption of three consecutive military governors from
Java (13) and the civil service.
However, corruption on provincial level was basically only the concern of the
educated elite in Ambon, especially university-based idealists. What was more
of concern to the local, grassroot Ambonese was the massive influx of
settlers from other provinces, namely from Java, South Sulawesi, and
Southeast Sulawesi. These much more entrepreneurial migrants began to
dominate the city life, from the markets to the public transport. In
addition, the numerous extractive industries that flourished in South and
North Maluku also imported their workforce from Java, Lombok, and South
Sulawesi. Consequently, with this massive influx of migrants, the religious
Balance between Muslims and Christians in Ambon began to tip in favour of
Muslims, a powder keg waiting to explode.
From the previous description of the cultural and economic oppression in
Maluku, one can easily understand that these could only happen under strict
military control by Jakarta. Apart from three consecutive governors which
were appointed by Jakarta from the army, the Pattimura army command in Maluku
was also under tutelage of the Brawijaya command of East Java. After Suharto
was forced to step down by the student movement in Java, which were smartly
manipulated by Ret. General Wiranto for his own political agenda, there was
also hope for political and economic reform in Maluku. Following the steps of
their comrades in Java, student activists in Maluku also became more militant
in opposing corruption as well as the military's 'dual function' (dwifungsi)
doctrine.
Unfortunately, General Wiranto who had been able to survive the transition
from Suharto to Habibie, certainly was not willing to relinquish the
military's power, especially with so many business links between military
foundations and the Suharto family businesses.
Habibie, whom some expected to be more sensitive to the aspirations of the non-Javanese
provinces, basically only catered for the aspirations of his own cronies from
South Sulawesi. And, since with Suharto's blessing he had already built his
power base among Muslim academics and bureaucrats who had joined his
state-sanctioned association, ICMI, Habibie began to fill in as many
governmental slots with his Muslim friends and followers.
This seems to be the spark that blew up the powder keg in Ambon, where the
Christian intelligentsia began to see themselves as custodians of the grassroot,
indigenous Ambonese and blamed their Muslim brothers for simply following the
national, Muslim lines.
This conflict can also be seen as a centre-periphery conflict. Or, a conflict
between the transformationists and the status quo defenders. The transformationists
saw the future of Maluku in a federal Indonesia, with Jakarta devolving power
to the states, without the involvement of the military in all walks of life
and a return of the control of Maluku's resources to the traditional owners.
On the other hand, those who defended the status quo saw that the existing
system was already benefitting them and strongly defended the unitarian state
and the role of the military in defending such kind of state.
Unfortunately, the first camp was more represented among Christian Moluccan
intellectuals and the secular, more environmental and indigenous-rights
oriented NGOs, which began to flourish in Maluku during the 15 year reign of
Emil Salim as Minister of Environment. While the second camp, which began more
vocal during the 15-months Habibie presidency, prefer to use Islamic symbols
as their identification marks.
Eventually, when Habibie lost the chance to legitimize his Suharto-derived
position in the November 1999 presidential race, and the new president,
Abdurrahman Wahid began to indicate his willingness to curtail the power of
the military as well as the Suharto oligarchy, disgruntled factions within
the military with the financial support of the Suharto oligarchy began to
join forces, and calls for a holy war (jihad) between Muslims and Christians
in Maluku, as well as the formation of jihad task forces, which were allowed
to train openly with swords and in Arabic style dress, became the norm of the
day.
At the moment, Maluku is the battleground where forces defending the
entrenched military and economic interests in Indonesia are exploiting every
single local ethnic and religious issue to delegitimize the current
administration of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Aditjondro,
2000b).
In this kind of situation, it could be expected that those who have
repeatedly been accused of wanting to separate from the unitarian state of
Indonesia, feel themselves being pushed into that corner. Looking at the
current development in West Papua, where Tom Beanal, a former board member of
the Indonesian Environmental Forum, who had taken the mining giant, Freeport
McMoRan to court in the US, is now leading the umbrella group fighting for
independence, it would not be surprising if in the near future, more young
and old Ambonese are demanding independence from Indonesia.
This has nothing to do with their religion, since many young and old
Achehnese, who have become disillusioned with the experience of 50 years
joining the Republic of Indonesia, are now loudly calling for a UN-supervised
referendum to fulfill their right to self-determination. Nobody can deny the
strong Islamic belief of the Achehnese people. Neither can one deny the fact
that many Riau intellectuals, who are now calling for an independent state,
are practicing Muslims and therefore are disillusioned to see their natural
resources enriching foreign multinationals and the Jakarta elite, while most
of Riau's villagers are still living below the poverty line.
It is, on the contrary, the intolerance of the central government to respect
the federalistic aspirations in Maluku, and even more so it is the
intolerance of those who want to repress the deep feeling of dissatisfaction
in Maluku by threatening them with a holy war, that is strengthening South
Moluccan nationalism.
In other words, the Balkanization of Eastern Indonesia has already began, and
increased troop deployments in Maluku as well as the 'religious apartheid'
policy of Jakarta, is only a temporary solution, both for Indonesia as a
whole as well as for Maluku in particular. A temporary solution, which is
shamefully maintained by snipers, who keep shooting innocent victims from
both side, each time the Moluccan people got tired of killing each other.
End Notes:
(1). I chose this term to replace the term 'race', which is an incorrect way
of distinguishing the different ethnic groups in Indonesia.
(2). I find this myth also embedded by press reports about Indonesian
politicians and generals, which state that "most Indonesians have only
one name", e.g. Suharto, Wiranto, etc. This statement mystifies the fact
that only Javanese of the older generation still use one name, and certainly
not all Indonesian ethno-linguistic groups which use their clan name as
family name. Even modern day Javanese -- including Suharto and Wiranto's
children and grand-children -- are now using family names.
(3). A honours thesis by a former staff person of mine, Abner Korwa, shows
how the canoe-building tradition of the Biak descendants on the Raja Ampat Islands,
is influenced by canoe building techniques from North Maluku. Also, some
maritime vocabulary among the coastal peoples of West Papua is derived from
Maluku and even Sulawesi.
(4). Nusantara, which is a Sanskrit-Indonesian word for archipelago, is
basically also what Indonesians call the archipelago where they live. It is a
more neutral term than Indonesia, which refers more specifically to the
political entity which is formally named the Unitarian State of the Republic
of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ).
(5). The term Ambonese is popularly used for inhabitants of the Central
Maluku islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, and the big island of
Ceram, which is believed to be the place of origins of all the Ambonese
people. Hence, Ceram (Seram) is also called 'Nusa Ina', the mother island.
(6). Similar ethnic prejudice based on conflicting roles during colonial eras
occur in Burma, with the Burman prejudice against the Christian Karen, who
fought with the British colonial troops against the Buddhist Burman. Or in
Vietnam, where Hmong hilltribes were used by the US occupation forces to
fight the lowland Vietnamese freedom fighters.
(7). Other Indonesian ethnic groups, such as the Javanese and the Batak
people from North Sumatra, were also well-represented in the KNIL. For
instance, Suharto, Indonesia's second president, was formerly a KNIL
sargeant, who moved to the Japanese-sponsored PETA paramilitary forces during
the independence war. Or, T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution, two former
commanders of the Indonesian army, who did not go through the Japanese PETA
period and directly moved into the Indonesian army (TNI).
(8). After the RMS rebellion on Ambon was crushed by TNI troops from Java,
many of the former Ambonese KNIL families were evacuated by the Dutch
government to the Netherlands, where a strong pro-RMS sentiment is still
strong among the Moluccan community of more than 40,000 people (Cohen, 1995).
Meanwhile, the remaining RMS (ex-KNIL) troops fled to the interior of Seram,
from where they continued a protracted guerilla war against the TNI forces
until 1964, when the RMS President, Chris Soumokil, was caught and sentenced
to death in Jakarta. Many local villagers in the interior of Seram have a
traumatic memory of that 1950-1964 period, when the ongoing protracted war
betwen the TNI forces and the RMS guerillas deprived them from their peaceful
hunting-gathering-and-rotational gardening lifestyle (see for instance, Wolff
& Florey, 1996: 270).
(9). This line of argument, blaming an 'RMS-GPM-PDI Perjuangan conspiracy'
for the inter-religious riots which have gone on and off since mid January
1999, and has taken a death toll of more than 3,000 people (AFP, May 1,
2000), is pushed by a retired Moluccan police commander, Brigadier General
Rustam Kastor, whose book has been circulating in e-mail form through a dozen
Islamic mailing lists, and has also been published in hard copy in Indonesia
(see Kanstor, 2000). It is also popular among the Muslim groups who oppose
President Abdurrahman Wahid's more inclusive religious politics.
(10). In addition to the RMS rebellion in Maluku, the young republic had to
deal with a series of rebellions on Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan
and Acheh, to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. This is known as the
DI-TII rebellion. Then, in the late 1950's, the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) supported a regional rebellion in North Sulawesi and Sumatra,
which was more aimed at a better deal for the regions in sharing regional revenues
with Jakarta. This is known as the PRRI-Permesta rebellion.
(11). Sometimes, without bothering its strict economic potentials, Sukarno
did indeed attempt to distribute the 'development sweets' strategically to
the regions which had been involved in those rebellions. In South Sulawesi,
from where Sukarno recruited his Minister of Industry, M. Jusuf, Sukarno
built a sugar mill in Bone, a cement factory in Tonasa, a paper mill in Gowa,
and developed the harbour of Makassar, which was called Sukarno-Hatta.
(12). This 'scapegoat' politics of labelling dissidents as members or
symphatizers of banned political parties or movements, has been a dominant
intimidation technique used by the security apparatus during the Suharto era.
In Java, the predominant scapegoat was the Communist Party (PKI). Muslim
dissidents, all over Indonesia, were often labelled as being members of the
Islamic rebellion, DI-TII. In West Papua, dissidents were often labelled as
members of the banned Papuan Independence Movement, OPM, and in East Timor,
one could easily be labelled as FRETILIN member (Aditjondro, 2000a: 178).
(13). Generals Sumeru, Hasan Slamet, and ...... For corruption under Sumeru,
see Tempo , June 7, 1975: 22. For corruption under Hasan Slamet, who was also
accused of being a womanizer, see report of DPP Angkatan Muda Pattimura to
First Lady, Mrs. Tien Soeharto, on September 15, 1980 (copies kept by the
author).
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Jeffrey A. Sluka (ed). Death
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